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I. I.       Introduction 
  
The US-led intervention in Haiti has often been held up as an example of how not to conduct 
foreign policy. Ill-defined and open-ended interventions in affairs of other countries for reasons tangential 
to national security are seen as primarily squandering US military resources and readiness on dubious 
results and outcomes that only generate more ill-will among those targeted for intervention. Furthermore, 
to the extent that problems in these countries may have been decades or centuries in the making, they are 
seen as only being fixed through the “n”-word—nation-building—whereby expensive ventures are 
undertaken to rebuild entire polities or economies. For many contemporary experts, such nation-building 
is at best misplaced hubris, at worst sheer folly. 
This paper uses the example of Haiti to propose that efforts to build peace in war-torn societies 
need not be endlessly expensive or open-ended, and if conducted with precision and moderation, can lead 
to the achievement of key long-term US foreign goals without undermining short-term priorities. This 
argument is presented from the prism of Haiti’s historical and current experience.  
  
II. The History of Conflict in Haiti 
  
Haiti’s history has conferred upon it a number of significant and unique disadvantages that have 
prevented the emergence of a stable polity or economy. Conversely, some of its unique characteristics, if 
adequately emphasized by its friends and neighbors, could also form the basis for lasting peace within its 
borders. 
Named by its first president—Dessalines—from “ayti,” the Taino Indian word for “mountainous 
lands,” Haiti was born with a strong sense of egalitarian nationhood. Its founders overthrew their masters 
and created an independent republic, the second independent nation in the Western hemisphere. While 
the majority of this republic’s citizens were formally Catholics, their popular religion—voudou (a blend 
of African animism, Catholicism, and everyday responses to the exigencies of slavery)—came to define 
perceptions of the mystical and the supernatural throughout the world. For a country of its small size (its 
population of six million is less than that of each of the world’s twenty biggest cities), Haiti developed a 
formidable presence on the global cultural stage, with its unique Creole culture, cuisine, music and art 
forming a staple for connoisseurs around the world. It remained one of the few countries in the 
hemisphere to have had both a woman president and a woman prime minister. And its poets and writers 
repeatedly contributed to the evolution of African thought and literature around the world. 
Haiti is also the poorest country in the Western hemisphere. On most measures of economic 
achievement, it ranks towards the bottom in the region, and also in the world. It is perhaps the only 
country in the world to have had, through the two hundred years of its independence, an economic 
product that has steadily grown downwards since its birth. It is perhaps the only tropical country in the 
world to have a significant chunk of its territory covered by barren rock and brush—the legacy of an 
environmental holocaust—in a climate strongly conducive to fecundity. Despite the enlightenment of 
some of its leaders, others had defined through their rule the very essence of inhumanity. However, the 
country has never completely collapsed. It has never been a “failed state,” in the contemporary 
international jargon, but a perennially failing one.  
Part of the answer as to why Haiti has acquired such unique historical characteristics lies in the 
evolution of its political economy before and after its independence. Colonial Haiti was the gem of the 
Caribbean. With freewheeling ports and large plantations that grew tobacco, coffee and molasses for 
Europe, Haiti was the region’s most sought after territory.1 French colonial rule, however, had certain 
particularities. Two ground-breaking works—Michel-Rolph Trouillot’s study of the Duvalier era, Haiti: 
State Against Nation, and Joan Dayan’s study of the links between Haitian history, religion and 
literature, Haiti, History and Gods—point to several of these and their subsequent impact on the course 
of Haitian history.  
An important particularity of the colonial political economy identified by Trouillot, and by 
anthropologist Sidney Mintz, were the gens de couleur, or people of mixed race, who were the offspring 
of French plantation owners and slave women. Unlike their English colonial counterparts, the French 
frequently indulged in conjugal relationships with their slaves, thus giving rise to a class of mulattoes 
who were often sent to France to be educated in the French language and customs. These colored 
individuals frequently aspired to, and sometimes attained, the commercial status and properties of their 
masters.2 Another important particularity identified by Trouillot related to land ownership in the colonial 
economy. The French not only sired children with their slaves, but let the latter farm small vegetable 
plots on their estates. For slaves who were otherwise horribly repressed, these plots were the only 
positive elements in their lives. After serving a long day under brutal conditions as members of organized 
labor gangs, slaves could return to their plots, where they were “masters of the soil.” While the brutal 
press-gang overseer therefore became the epitome of evil, one’s own small plot of land became the 
pinnacle of good. Hence, when the slaves won their independence from the French and took over their 
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master’s lands, many of them chose not to revive the plantation economy3 and its forced labor, but 
instead divided the land into small landholdings geared towards subsistence agriculture and the 
generation of modest surpluses. In their strident egalitarianism on this issue, they predated rural Maoism 
by a century-and-a-half.  
Smallholding, however virtuous it was for the freed slaves, held little promise for the gens de 
couleur, who had thrived in the plantation economy. Their motives for rebellion against the French had 
more in common with the burghers who led the American war of independence than with the slaves who 
sought a rural idyll, i.e., they wished to overthrow the French yoke so that they could exploit the riches of 
Saint-Domingue not as second-class citizens but as entrepreneurs in their own right. Their conception of 
land use therefore involved a continuation of the plantation economy rather than subsistence farming. 
While slaves and the gens de couleur, or mulattoes, joined hands to fight the war of independence, their 
differing conceptions of Haiti’s political economy clashed shortly after independence, when the 
country’s militantly egalitarian first president—Dessalines—was assassinated in a conspiracy reportedly 
fomented by his mulatto general Petion, who then became president.  
Haiti’s mulattoes, however, did not try to force the peasantry back into a plantation economy. 
Having fought a war against the French together with the freed slaves, they did not wish to undertake 
coercive actions that would have been tantamount to re-establishing slavery. The peasants were allowed 
to retain their own plots of land, a right which they had won from the French plantation owners, and 
which defined Haitian nationhood.4 While a brief attempt was made shortly after independence under the 
breakaway regime of Henri Christophe in the north of Haiti to revive the plantation economy, the 
subsequent death of Christophe and the re-unification of Haiti paved the way for the institutionalization 
of a static economic equilibrium.5  
In this new economic order, the mulattoes—both military and civilian—joined hands with the 
black officer class in the army to form a mercantile elite that dominated a largely extractive state.6 The 
primary division social division, however, was not between people of different color, but between an 
urban class that derived its income from the export of the modest surplus created by the peasantry, and a 
peasant class who owned their own land but who had their small surpluses expropriated for export by the 
city dwellers. This primarily economic division was reinforced by a cultural division in which the urban 
elite spoke French, equated erudition with a French education, and practiced Catholicism. The peasantry, 
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on the other hand, spoke Creole, placed a premium on practical knowledge of agriculture, and practiced 
voudou under a veneer of Catholicism. 
While allowing the peasantry to retain their plots of land, the Haitian state continued to levy 
progressively higher taxes via customs houses on the export of peasant produce. The middle-men who 
brought this produce to the ports passed these taxes on to the peasants. Eventually, custom house receipts 
became the mainstay of the Haitian state, which had organized itself not to invest in growing the 
economy or developing factors of production, but to merely collect revenues. The Haitian elite sustained 
itself through parasitic taxation rather than through production; the more thorough exploitation of the 
countryside for commercial purposes was stayed by an informal social pact that arose from the shared 
legacy of the struggle for independence.  
Given the parasitic nature of the Haitian state, Haitian politics became centered around struggles 
among various urban groups to control the biggest chunk of taxation revenues. 7 Politicians became more 
obsessed with the ritual and procedure of politics, which affected their ability to grab a share of state’s 
bounty for their constituencies, than with larger social and economic questions. Of course, this obsession 
was frequently couched in a nobler political discourse that mirrored the existing debates in Europe. This 
situation has not changed much in contemporary Haiti, where the political system remains incapable of 
articulating a national project that would employ the energies of all sectors in promoting development, 
and remains focused on the appropriation of spoils for political loyalists.  
Perhaps the most significant question in Haitian history remains that of the failure of country’s 
elite to ever create a nation-wide development enterprise. 8 Despite the potential for significant 
commercial earnings from the production and export of cash crops, the state did little to foster the 
requisite political economy. While the building of common cause with slaves to obtain independence 
from the French might explain the bourgeoisie’s initial reluctance to coerce the peasantry into a massive 
revival of the plantation economy, it does not explain the subsequent inability of the elite to foster, even 
given these parameters, the modicum of economic growth or expansion. A partial explanation has been 
identified by Trouillot, who points out that the sixty-year embargo slapped on Haiti by foreign powers in 
the nineteenth century for daring to overthrow its colonial masters stunted the development of the Haitian 
economy by making it more profitable for Haitian and foreign merchants to exploit loopholes in the 
embargo than to make investments in productive capital. 9 A broader explanation, however, may also lie 
in the sweep of Haitian history. 
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Historically, countries that have been able to create economic development and expansion have 
had either strongly cohesive national identities, such as the United States or the United Kingdom, or have 
had strong elites that have not, for reasons of ideology or race, hesitated to coerce other population 
groups within that country into providing the raw material for economic expansion. Guatemala and South 
Africa fall within the latter category. A third category involves countries such as India and Brazil, where 
strong national identities have allowed the elite to persuade the rest of the population to bear the costs of 
economic expansion. 
None of these circumstances were to be found in Haiti shortly after independence. The shared 
affinity between the elite and the masses brought about by the independence struggle did not translate 
into a cohesive enough national identity. The freed slaves viewed the elite and its wealth with suspicion. 
Their egalitarian ideals did not sit well with the latter’s quest for profit and capital accumulation. The 
elite, on the other hand, viewed the peasantry’s lack of economic yearning and their voudou practices 
with utter disdain. These mutually negative perceptions prevented the formation of any national capital 
generation enterprise over the next two centuries. The same factors perhaps also accounted for the 
inability of the Haitian elite to persuade the masses to participate voluntarily in any type of national 
development. Caught in an almost self-perpetuating equilibrium of mistrust, Haiti’s social sectors have 
historically had only one collective enterprise to their credit—the war of independence that created the 
country. 
 Given its chronic inability to develop either a national program or a substantive politics, Haiti 
had seen a considerable devastation of its land and resources by the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Lack of investment and organization in agriculture, for instance, meant the absence of a system for 
adjudicating disputes over land titles, and also of any long-term attempts to conserve or renew the soil. 
Little protection or incentive was provided to the peasantry to enable it to develop its land.10 There were 
no rural services provided by the state to enable the farmers to capitalize on their natural inclination to 
form instant cooperative work-gangs (or konbite11) to assist each other in times of distress.12 The practice 
of forming konbite, a residual albeit voluntary phenomenon from the colonial days, indicated a strong 
communal spirit among the peasantry that, while it may not have led to cooperative land ownership, 
certainly did augur well for cooperative investing, marketing and even profit-sharing. These modes of 
economic activity, if they had been fostered, would not just have led to rural development, but also have 
been compatible with peasant aversion to gross individual wealth accumulation. 
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Following the end of the Civil War, the United States had ended its participation in the Western 
embargo on Haiti, and had recognized the country. US mercantile interest, waxing rapidly in Latin 
America and the Pacific, soon turned towards Haiti, where the growing crisis over land and resources had 
also led to a more rapid turnover in governments. The increased instability and levels of violence, and the 
Chase National Bank’s interest in protecting its Haitian interests, led the United States to intervene in 
Haiti in 1915. The intervention’s primary objective was marketize the country’s economy, and create an 
outlet for US investment. The US military commanders, in accordance with the prevalent racial attitudes 
at the time, quickly identified the mulattoes among the elite as their primary intermediaries. This was 
their first error as far as establishing a market economy was concerned. The system, as it existed, did not 
yet—despite ongoing crises—offer the elite enough incentives for change. The US military commanders 
also decided that the peasantry was idle and had to be forced into productive work. This assessment was, 
of course, quite incorrect. US attempts to press the peasantry into work gangs to build roads for a market 
economy soon prompted a peasant revolt led by Charlemagne Peralte, who kept American marines 
distracted from their nation-building enterprise for the better part of the duration of the US intervention. 
 US commanders also concluded that the inability of the Haitian state to spread its mantle 
throughout the countryside was one of the barriers to economic organization. This conclusion was 
incorrect, in that it was the balance between Port-au-Prince and the various outposts of the state in the 
regional centers that had stayed all-out parasitic repression in the first place. In addition, the Haitian army 
still retained the sense of having led its people to independence, and therefore of treating them with a 
modicum of respect.  
US commanders replaced this old army with the Garde Nationale d’Haiti, which was trained to 
inflict its will more systematically and which later became the dreaded Forces Armée d’Haiti (FAd’H). 
The new guard saw less reason to be restrained when taxing the common Haitians. In fact, it saw itself as 
constituting a new praetorian elite, and therefore undeserving of any kind of challenge or balance.  
In the aftermath of the US departure from Haiti in 1934, the guard played an increasingly 
prominent role in internal repression. Simultaneously, a small largely-black middle class spawned by US 
military and economic projects began to espouse views that often clashed with those of the traditional 
elite. In the 1950s, this group generated a nationalist movement called Les Griots. Riding this wave of 
black nationalism, and also the backs of the repressive new army, a physician named Francois Duvalier 
ascended to the presidency in 1957. Like all nationalists and populists that preceded him, Duvalier began 
his presidency by targeting select members of the mulatto elite, and even the Catholic Church that had 
traditionally supported the establishment. He drove several members of this gentry into exile. The 
remnants quickly adapted to the new order, which consisted of a cult of personality brutally and 
arbitrarily enforced at all levels of Haitian society by the notorious Volunteers for National Security, or 
tonton macoutes. Like his populist predecessors, Duvalier started out claiming to be able to emancipate 
the masses, but instead created an even more oppressive and dysfunctional version of the system 
centered entirely on himself.  Despite his rhetoric, however, Duvalier was no messiah for Haiti’s masses. 
Under his vicious rule, Haiti’s economy sank even further. And in spite of their apparent persecution, the 
merchants increased their share of the country’s wealth. Social inequities became worse. 
 After his death in 1971, Duvalier was succeeded by his son Jean-Claude, who had a milder 
temperament than his father. In many ways, he was the kind of benign despot who was seen as a force 
for growth in the developing world at that time. Foreign donors therefore conceived of a new strategy for 
Haiti, which was predicated on the assumption that Haiti's only remaining comparative advantage as an 
economy was the availability of labor at rock-bottom prices for assembling consumer goods primarily for 
the US market. Under this strategy, assembly industries, once established and flourishing, would form 
the engine for growth that would motor the rest of the economy.13 International assistance, then, would 
contribute towards creating state institutions that could guarantee a stable and free market for the 
assembly manufacturers, and towards providing infrastructure such as power plants and feeder roads for 
the assembly plants.  
While this development strategy was based in sound economic theory, several things went wrong 
with its implementation.14 First, to the extent that the strategy was not formulated on the basis of a broad 
popular or even an elite consensus, it could not mobilize the majority of the Haitians to make it work. 
Second, the Duvalier state was as lacking in social and economic roots15 in the rest of Haitian society as 
its predecessors, even though it had access to a large and decentralized mechanism for inflicting terror in 
the form of the tontons macoutes.16 Lacking roots, and therefore substance, the state did not take the 
effort to streamline and modernize itself to run a competitive and productive market economy to benefit 
the majority of Haitians, as had been anticipated by the foreign donors.17 Third, Haitian elites who 
subcontracted and worked for the assembly manufacturers transferred all their earnings abroad, and did 
not reinvest in Haiti to create a sustainable indigenous dynamic of savings, reinvestment, and new 
production. In the absence of a broader national framework, the elite saw little incentive for keeping their 
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money within the country.18 Also, while the Duvalier regime’s nationalism had helped to create a tiny 
black middle class, it had done little to diminish the stranglehold of a few large mercantile families on 
the Haitian economy.19 These families had little interest in increasing local production.20 Hence, even 
assembly manufacturing did not reach its full potential.  
An important apparent lapse in these development policies was to not take into account the 
historic exclusion of the peasantry by the ruling elite.21 The general assumption was that as the decline of 
Haitian agriculture continued to produce an outflow of migrants to the cities, they would be absorbed by 
the new industries. However, since the latter did not live up to their full potential, the unabsorbed 
migrants congregated in large slums in Port-au-Prince. Those peasants that still remained in the rural 
areas had little contact with the state, and little access to services with which to develop their 
considerable artisanal and productive talents.  
A focused effort to marketize this peasantry through devices that have been used elsewhere in 
the developing world such as rural cooperatives and micro-credit could have led to some positive 
engagement between the state and the peasantry. Given the fact that, despite years of massive migration, 
most Haitians still live rural lives, any engagement between the state and the peasantry might have 
allowed the former to move beyond parasitism. What was needed was a development strategy that 
required the fullest possible engagement between the state and its people, even if such a strategy made 
only partial economic sense in the short run, since such engagement might have prompted a more 
resilient political process better able to deal with internal tensions. A state situated within a more 
substantial national framework might, then, have fulfilled international expectations by providing stable 
support for a flourishing market that, among other industries, would also have allowed assembly 
manufacturing to take root.22 Given the stark divergence of the elite and peasant conceptions of Haitian 
nationhood shortly after independence, the issue of the peasants' status was not just significant from the 
economic standpoint, but also from the perspective of defining the nature and the role of the Haitian state 
in the country's economy and society. Furthermore, enabling the peasants to acquire sustainable and 
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profitable livelihoods in their localities would also have prevented the rapid growth of slums in the cities 
during the mid-1970s to mid-1980s. 
In the event this did not happen, large numbers of Haitians not only came to cities to find 
themselves unemployed but, freed for the first time in their history from rural isolation, discovered that at 
the heart of a lot of their problems lay a non-functioning state. The equilibrium of mistrust that had 
defined the economic and political parameters of Haiti since independence had now been disturbed.  
Beginning in the early 1980s, a movement for change grew in both urban and rural areas that 
sought a sometimes violent overthrow of what was seen as a failed system.23 This movement was led first 
by the Haitian version of the Roman Catholic liberation theology church, the ti legliz,24 and then 
increasingly by the progressive members of a small middle class that had grown under the wings of 
foreign development assistance and maquiladora investment. Popular frustrations, accentuated by the 
massive numbers of Haitians living in slums, often led to violent incidents between the elite and the 
activists. The state, knowing no other form of response, reacted with brute force. The resulting domestic 
and international reaction caused Jean-Claude Duvalier to flee into exile in 1986. General Namphy took 
control of the government. 
In the four years following the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier, Haiti saw a number of coups 
and ineffective governments as the elite reacted to the popular upsurge. Clearly, Haiti's wholly 
inadequate political process could neither manage the economic development program of the 1980s, nor 
the consequences that ensued from its failure. 
A potentially important moment in Haitian history, perhaps the first opportunity to generate a 
truly national enterprise since the struggle for independence, was lost in 1987, when a National Congress 
of Democratic Movements representing Haitians of all stripes—leaders of the peasantry, the business 
elite, religious organizations, human rights groups, and others—was convened to assist in drafting a post-
Duvalier constitution. With their totalitarian repression, the Duvaliers had achieved what other more 
noble causes had failed to achieve—a uniting of all of Haiti’s sectors as had not been seen since the 
ceremony at Bois-Caiman in 1791 that had launched the country’s war for independence. The Congress 
concluded with support for Haiti’s new 1987 Constitution, a Provisional Electoral Council to conduct the 
next elections, and a plan to keep the various sectors mobilized and coordinated in support of democracy. 
Yet this opportunity was soon lost. Haiti’s friends in the region, for reasons that are still unclear, 
chose to ignore what was clearly a democratic and progressive movement and perhaps the best bet to 
promote both free markets and democracy, and supported instead the promises of General Namphy that 
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he could guarantee a stable democratic transition and hold a fair elections. When the elections were 
eventually held, the Congress’ candidate Gerard Gourgue, was expected to win. General Namphy’s 
thugs, however, carried out a massacre at a polling station that led to the elections being annulled. This 
tragedy was both poignant and ironic. If the Congress had won, the elections might have set the stage for 
first significant, and more moderate and progressive, re-orientation of the country since its independence. 
In the event that the massacre convinced most Haitians that more extreme steps were called for, and set 
the stage for a dynamic of response and counter-response between the elite and the masses. The lack of 
strong external support for the Congress was also clearly a failure of preventive action on the part of 
international actors, in that an opportunity was lost to pre-empt the conflict that followed and to save the 
hundreds of millions of dollars spent on keeping peace in its aftermath. 
The failed elections of 1987 were followed by rigged elections in 1988, which prompted the 
international community, with monitors from the UN, OAS, CARICOM and the US, to intervene to 
guarantee free and fair elections in 1990—the first of their kind in Haitian history.25 A former World 
Bank official, Marc Bazin, headed a coalition of progressive parties and was viewed as a likely winner. 
Instead, to the elite’s chagrin, he lost to the popular priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had proposed a 
popular upsurge or ‘Lavalas’—literally “flood”—against corrupt governance. Traditional political parties 
affiliated with the elite retained control, however, of the parliament. 
The loose movement that had coalesced under Aristide’s leadership during this period under the 
“Lavalas” banner offered a comprehensive cross-section of pro-democracy trends in Haiti. It included 
venerable peasant movements such as the Hinche-based Mouvman Papaye de Paysan; the remnants of 
the 1987 CONACOM; some representatives of a still small, but increasingly larger and progressive, 
middle class; a wide range of human rights and pro-democracy organizations; and a host of discordant 
“popular organizations” constituted primarily of slum-based and unemployed migrants. To the extent that 
they were subsumed under Aristide’s fiery rhetoric and messianic persona, to which they willingly 
submitted order to ensure victory in the 1990 elections, “Lavalas” was seen as a monolith by many in the 
international community, and the primary political split in Haiti, and hence the need for dialogue, was 
also unfortunately seen as being between “Lavalas” on the one hand, and a handful of small opposition 
parties representing the traditional elite on the other.  
On assuming the presidency, Aristide and his supporters appropriated the term “Lavalas” for 
their government. In the nine months of the first Aristide government in 1991, clashes between the 
parliament and the presidency were frequent. However, this was not parliamentary politics of a 
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conventional sort. The Lavalas government and its opponents both brought their supporters out into the 
streets to push their positions. This was a frightening time for Haiti's traditional elite. Many interpreted 
Aristide's fiery rhetoric regarding the uprooting of the old system as calling for their physical 
extermination. However, they only reacted to this situation, and did not take measures to challenge 
Aristide by reaching out to the population on their own, or by building agendas and strategies of a 
progressive nature. The technocrats in the Aristide government, on the other hand, were able to come up 
with an economic plan that won the approval of international financial institutions.26 The plan sought to 
streamline government27, collect taxes efficiently, and redefine the role of the state as a net provider of 
services, and not as a net extractor of value. However, the government failed to put this plan to public 
debate, thus foregoing the opportunity to build consensus around its key tenets. Instead, rowdy 
demonstrators called for compliance with the Lavalas agenda.28 For their part, many in the elite saw the 
plan as being little more than a vendetta against their interests. In the absence of attempts to construct a 
broader, more sober, consensus, the plan became a victim of Haiti's perennial theatre of violence. And so 
did the progressive agenda of the first Aristide government. Fearing extinction, Haiti's elite and the 
armed forces allied with it responded with a coup in September, 1991. 
It is important to note that Aristide was catapulted to power in the 1990 elections not on the basis 
of a popular desire for the institutions and norms of democracy, but as the vanguard of a new regime that 
would fundamentally transform the polity in a radical fashion. These expectations, reflected in Aristide's 
‘flood’ rhetoric, contradicted the gradualist approach of both those members of the “Lavalas” alliance 
who belonged to the small but growing middle class and the few progressive elements among the 
traditional political and economic elite. The elected government of 1990-91, therefore, embodied a 
fundamental contradiction. It sought to address popular demands for overwhelming social and economic 
change through the forms and institutions of electoral democracy, which traditionally postdate such 
change and are ill-adapted to rapid and radical transformation. This contradiction was perpetuated in 1994 
when Aristide was restored to power. 
Many have argued that both Gerard Gourgue and Marc Bazin, unburdened by Aristide’s 
apocalyptic visions of cleansing floods and fires and the historical memories these evoked of Dessalines’ 
pogroms, might have been better able to persuade the Haitian elite to accept a progressive program of 
change. While this question cannot be answered hypothetically, it is quite clear that both the 1987 
Congress and the ensuing elections, as well as the economic plan of the first Lavalas government, 
constituted significant opportunities for Haiti to move forward together as a nation. In both instances, 
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however, Haiti’s friends and neighbors displayed great ambiguity towards these historic moments, and 
the moments were soon lost. Subsequently, numerous efforts have been carried out in vain by the 
international community to re-create the possibilities that these moments represented.  
  
III. The International Response to Conflict in Haiti 
  
After taking power, the military regime embarked on campaign of systematic slaughter of 
“Lavalas” activists. This campaign, and the resulting outflow of refugees, prompted a concerted 
international response. The response of the two regional organizations of which Haiti is a member—the 
Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)—was especially 
vigorous, spurred by both the OAS' firm post-Cold War commitment to the consolidation of democracy 
in the Western Hemisphere29 and the crucial role played by both organizations in facilitating and 
monitoring the election won by Aristide. The OAS rapidly suspended all aid to Haiti, except 
humanitarian assistance. When the OAS delegation negotiating with the military regime was ordered to 
leave the country, the organization called on members to impose a trade embargo. 
 In Autumn 1992, the UN authorized a joint OAS/UN envoy to negotiate with the military 
government.30 The coup leader, General Cedras, accepted a proposal to establish a joint OAS/UN civilian 
mission (MICIVIH) to monitor human rights in Haiti and agreed to work under the leadership of the 
OAS/UN Special Envoy toward reviving Haiti’s fledgling democratic institutions.  
 Efforts to engage the Haitian military in dialogue with Aristide, however, made little overall 
progress. On June 16, 1993, the Security Council placed an oil and arms embargo upon Haiti. Cedras then 
indicated a willingness to negotiate. The resulting agreement, signed at Governors’ Island in New York, 
committed Cedras to retire from government and allow Aristide's return to Haiti. In the interim, Aristide 
was to work with the Haitian parliament to restore the normal functioning of Haiti's institutions, while the 
UN was to provide a small peacekeeping force to help modernize the armed forces and assist in the 
creation of a new civilian police force. 
 Initial signs were promising, with the Haitian parliament ratifying Aristide's appointment of 
Robert Malval as prime minister and the Security Council lifting the embargo on Haiti and authorizing a 
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United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The promise quickly turned sour, however, when an UNMIH 
deployment was met by hostile demonstrations, prompting the withdrawal of the deployment and the 
flight of most members of the OAS/UN mission—MICIVIH—already in Haiti. The Security Council 
rapidly reimposed the arms and oil embargo and instituted a naval blockade.31 On October 15, the Justice 
Minister in the Malval cabinet was assassinated. By early 1994, the few remaining MICIVIH personnel 
reported an alarming increase in human rights violations. Facing intransigence from the military 
government, the Security Council imposed further sanctions, to which the regime responded by 
appointing a ‘provisional’ president, who formally expelled MICIVIH from the country in July 1994.  
 By 1994, the deteriorating situation in Haiti had loosed a surge of refugees on American 
shores, putting domestic pressure on the Clinton Administration. The upshot of resulting US activism was 
a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the formation of a US-led "multi-national force" (MNF) to 
facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership and the restoration of the legitimate 
authorities.  
 In mid-September 1994, President Clinton finally declared all diplomatic measures exhausted 
and ordered the MNF to use force to remove the military regime. Faced with this impending invasion, the 
Cedras regime appealed for a last-minute intercession. After skillful negotiation by a distinguished 
American team, Haiti's military leaders agreed to resign subject to an amnesty from the Haitian 
parliament. As a result, the MNF was able to move into Haiti on September 19 without opposition.32 
President Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994. In 1995, the MNF handed over the task of 
peacekeeping to UNMIH. 
 Subsequently, in 1998, after three years of peacekeeping, the UN Security Council reduced the 
UN role in Haiti to supporting the further development of a civilian police force. In 2000 the OAS/UN 
human rights monitoring mission, and UN peacekeeping in Haiti ended. A new civilian mission, MICAH, 
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IV. Assessment of the International Response to the Crisis in Haiti 
  




Restoration of elected government in 1994. 
First ever changeover of presidency through 
elections in Haiti’s history in 1996. 
  
Failure on the part of the political elite to reach 
consensus on the overall form or purpose of 
Haiti’s democracy. Continued political 
deadlock. 
  
Creation of a new civilian police force, the 
Haitian National Police. The first time in the 
country’s history that uniformed authority had 
been neutral. 
  
Continued institutional weakness of the police. 
Failure to check growing political interference 
in police work, and inability of police to control 
rising, including drug-related, crime. 
  
Emergence of autonomous civil society—
unions, peasant organizations, human rights 
groups, and trade and professional associations. 
  
Reluctance on part of elite to allow civil society 
to play autonomous roles. 
  
  
More proactive role by elements of traditional 
elites—Catholic and Protestant church 
hierarchies, Chamber of Commerce—in 
supporting the development of democratic 
political culture. 
  
Electoral disputes, and worsening of the 
political deadlock, in the parliamentary and 
presidential elections of 2000. 
  
Rise in numbers of international and domestic 
efforts to make economic assets available to the 
peasantry and the informal sector, i.e. the 
largest section of the Haitian population. 
Greater investment by Haitian diaspora in Haiti 
in aftermath of restoration of democracy. 
  
Virtual absence of foreign investment in Haiti 
due to continued political instability and high 
crime rates. Inability of political system to 




 Despite numerous criticisms, both the initial international response to Haiti’s immediate crisis 
and the subsequent peacekeeping operations accomplished their key goals. Haiti’s elected government 
was restored, and a civilian police force created to replace the repressive army, all without losing a single 
peacekeeper.33 
 The key deficiencies in the international response to Haiti that became manifest shortly thereafter 
were not in the conduct of the peacekeeping operation in Haiti, but in the international strategy for 
understanding and dealing with Haiti’s long-term political impasse. When Aristide was restored, so was 
the deadlock that had characterized his previous government. Part of the package for his restoration 
should have been the institution of a comprehensive multi-sectoral dialogue, chaired by him as the 
President, but facilitated by Haitian civil society and observed by the international community, on key 
elements of political and economic reform. In the absence of such an effort, Haiti’s weak political 
institutions remained deadlocked along class and factional lines. The international community did not 
apprehend that the real divisions in Haiti are not between political parties: the political process does not 
accurately or substantively represent and embody the country’s interest groups. There were no precedents 
or entities for facilitating gradual change through consensus; this was neither the focus of Aristide’s 
rhetoric nor that of his opponents in the military and the oligarchy. 
International actors—led by the European Union and the United States in this instance—have 
provided some assistance for building democratic practices into Haiti's nascent institutions. Political 
parties as well as parliamentarians have received training programs targeted at building their 
understanding of democratic political processes. Civic education programs targeted at inculcating 
democratic civic virtues have also been launched among the population-at-large. These tutelary 
approaches, however, have had little lasting impact. The population demands the radical redress of its 
more immediate plight and sees little gain from gradual democratization, while the political elite focuses 
on maintaining control of the limited state institutions. 
The divisions between Aristide and his opponents are also reflected in the gradual inability of the 
new Haitian National Police, created after he abolished the army in 1995, to maintain law and order in a 
neutral or effective manner. Despite initial successes, primarily in rooting out corruption among its own 
ranks, the Police had a dismal record of following up on crimes, particularly where high-profile political 
assassinations were concerned. While during a political crisis in early 1999, the police did remain neutral 
and maintain public order, the protracted political deadlock and the ensuing suspension of international 
aid have badly affected the police force. Some officers have become involved in drug traffic as Haiti has 
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become the favorite transshipment point for Colombian traffickers, handling 8% of all cocaine entering 
the US. Drug-related corruption extends through all levels of government and drug-funded construction 
has become Port-au-Prince’s predominant economic activity. Partisan behavior by the police, often under 
political pressure, has grown. In the aftermath of the first round of parliamentary elections in 2000, a 
number of opposition candidates were arrested on dubious charges of fomenting political violence. After 
local and international protest, they were released. The continuing high crime rates and increasing 
politicization of the police have undermined confidence in the possibility of a democratic and neutral state 
that is able to provide all sectors with basic security. As a result, the popular yearning for a return to 
stronger, possibly authoritarian, government has grown. 
It is noteworthy that the Police would have been less subject to political manipulation had it been 
better resourced and trained. In the aftermath of Aristide’s restoration, however, the bulk of international 
assistance went towards the actual cost of peacekeeping and the revival of the moribund Haitian 
economy, and not towards the maintenance of a viable police force. Ironically, most of the economic 
assistance provided by external actors to Haiti remains unused, as a political system populated by 
politicians fearful for their lives has continued to be deadlocked and incapable of delivering the design 
and implementation of economic programs. Through practices tantamount to racketeering, the state 
apparatus has continued to reap benefits from the limited economic activity for those in authority. The 
line between the private and public sector has been blurred, with both sectors often controlled by the same 
elements.34 Debates over privatization mask narrower factional disputes over control of a few state-owned 
enterprises.  
Haiti's 1987 constitution bars two consecutive presidential terms. Hence, in accordance with his 
promise at Governors' Island to assist in building Haiti's frail institutions, Aristide agreed to step down as 
President at the end of his first term in 1996. His supporters, however, argued that since he had spent 
most of this term in exile, he should be allowed a second term. The international community informally 
backed the constitutional position. It helped to finance and monitor the presidential elections in 1995 that 
led Rene Preval to succeed Aristide as president, and has assisted with subsequent national and local 
elections. While the peaceful, democratic transfer of power from Aristide to Preval through elections was 
a historic accomplishment, as the first of its kind in the country's history, Haitian institutions subsequently 
became deadlocked. 
The governments of both Aristide and Preval had agreed to implement the economic plan first 
conceived at the beginning of the Aristide presidency, with the support of international financial 
institutions, in 1991. Key elements of this plan were a restructuring and privatization of the small and 
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corrupt public sector and a series of other economic reforms designed to boost the confidence of both 
Haitian and international entrepreneurs. Aristide argued that this reform package would only benefit a 
small elite and cause great suffering to the majority of the population. His opposition to this plan from 
mid-1995 onwards halted key components of the reform process. Neither Aristide nor his newly formed 
Fanmi Lavalas party sought to promote a multi-sectoral dialogue on an alternative path to economic 
reform that could have addressed what might have been genuine concerns regarding the stringent 
demands made by international financial institutions. The pre-coup “Lavalas” movement had, by contrast, 
displayed a talent for generating creative solutions and compromises through dialogue. A key difference 
was that many talented negotiators and functionaries in the “Lavalas” movement had grown disillusioned 
with Aristide’s assumption of a messianic persona and had either formed splinter parties, or moved into 
the private or non-profit sectors, leaving Haiti altogether. 
The stand-off over economic reform was complicated by a dispute over the legislative and 
municipal elections of April 6, 1997. The electoral process was halted before the second round of 
voting.35 In June 1997, Prime Minister Rosny Smarth resigned in frustration, further paralyzing the 
government.36 Successive attempts to appoint a Prime Minister foundered over splits between the two 
major factions into which “Lavalas” legislators in parliament had split over Aristide’s policies and 
persona—the anti-Aristide Organization of People in Struggle (OPL) and the pro-Aristide Fanmi Lavalas. 
In March 1999, after concerted facilitation efforts by international mediators and some civic 
organizations, certain opposition parties reached an informal accord with the President for appointing an 
interim prime minister and a new Electoral Council, and for holding new legislative elections. The costly 
consequence of this political wrangling was to delay large amounts of international development 
assistance. The deadlock also caused an almost complete dissipation of the popular energies and 
enthusiasm generated by the democracy movement of late 1980s. Despite international efforts, the Haitian 
political process thus appeared largely incapable of addressing internal tensions. 
In May and June 2000, legislative and municipal elections were finally held to break this 
deadlock. In the first round, between 55-60% of the electorate voted, the majority for Fanmi Lavalas, 
perhaps in the hope that having the presidency and parliament under the same party would break the 
political deadlock. A dispute quickly arose over electoral procedure. International observers demanded a 
recount for certain seats in the Senate before second round voting. The Haitian government refused, 
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saying that it could not control the decisions of the Provisional Electoral Council. The latter defended its 
vote-count formula, saying that it had improvised under highly imperfect circumstances. Controversy 
grew with the flight to the US of the Council’s chairman, who claimed that his life had been threatened. 
When the Haitian government decided to proceed with the second round of voting without recounting the 
first round, the OAS withdrew its observer mission. Shortly thereafter, the US suspended assistance to the 
country’s police force. The opposition parties declared the onset of authoritarianism. 
After several failed attempts by the international community to resolve the issue of the vote count 
in a manner that both Fanmi Lavalas and the opposition parties would find satisfactory, the Haitian 
government proceeded to conduct the presidential election in November 2000, despite international 
reservations. All opposition parties boycotted the election, and, as the same flawed Provisional Electoral 
Council conducted it, the international community did not recognize its results. Haiti’s donors declared 
that they were suspending all official aid to the country until a solution to the political impasse had been 
found that was acceptable to all parties involved, and that future aid would be disbursed through NGOs. 
Recently, the Organization of American States has resumed, through its Secretary-General Cesar 
Gaviria, its political role in the country, whereby it has been attempting to mediate between Aristide, who 
was re-elected president in 2000 in a controversial elections boycotted by the opposition, and an umbrella 
grouping of opposition parties. However, these and other international attempts at mediation, while 
laudable and partly successful, have rarely sought to engage the full spectrum of Haitian society so as to 
keep the primary political protagonists on their toes, and accountable for their words and actions. To the 
extent that all political actors in Haiti make their claims on behalf of the Haitian population, the latter 
might be in a better position to call them to order than the international community alone.  
This cyclical dynamic of Haitian obstinacy and international reaction could have been arrested at 
a much earlier stage, when political deadlock first ensued in 1996-97, through a more creative application 
of international facilitation efforts to encourage Haitian civil society, particularly the Catholic and 
Protestant Churches, to play a more active role in bridging political divides. Instead, international 
mediators undertook informal efforts to negotiate between Aristide and the primary breakaway “Lavalas” 
faction, the OPL, and left aside both other political actors as well as key elements of civil society. These 
mediation efforts did not yield significant or quick results, and often left all parties pointing at external 
actors as unnecessarily meddlesome in Haitian affairs. It is important to note that despite Aristide’s 
incumbency as President, Haiti’s small middle class remains apprehensive of runaway populism. Aristide 
won the popular vote in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2000, but lacks the confidence of 
the business and middle classes, a minority whose entrepreneurial and managerial talent is essential for 
Haiti’s economic revival. Elections are not the central issue; the underlying problem is the different social 
sectors’ near total lack of confidence in each others’ objectives and intentions. 
A starting point for confidence-building would be to work towards consensus, with Haiti’s small 
but increasingly active civil society as the intermediary, on a few pragmatic issues whereby the state can 
direct its limited resources and energies towards providing security and primary capital such as roads, 
education and micro-credit lending. The provision of such goods should benefit all classes and sectors, 
and allow for real growth in the Haitian economy. Discourse centered on such public goods may also 
allow for Haiti’s national debates to move from the divisive discourse of wealth redistribution to that of 
more equitable opportunities for wealth creation. Initiatives to provide appropriately targeted credit, and 
convert informal holdings to formal titles, have led peasants in parts of the country both to revive and 
expand market production, and could be encouraged. International donors could encourage cooperative 
farming in order to eliminate the inefficiencies of scale generated by smallholder farming.  
In this context, it is important to note that localized schemes have helped to bring parts of the 
country’s sizeable informal economy into the economic mainstream, by giving informal entrepreneurs 
titles to their assets and registering them so that they are eligible for assistance, such as small loans and 
credit, on easy terms. Prominent examples include a plan developed jointly by the Aristide government 
and by the Center for Free Enterprise and Democracy with the assistance of economist Hernando de Soto 
to formalize informal property holdings, and the significant expansion of its loan portfolio by one of the 
country’s largest commercial banks, Sogebank, to include micro-entrepreneurs.37 Economic purists may 
argue that this is an inefficient, small-scale approach to poverty reduction – but micro-entrepreneurism 
has proven to be a workable approach to long-term growth, and may be a more realistic option in a post-
conflict economy than schemes for attracting large industry.  
The discourse on public goods could also focus on the country’s moribund judicial system, which 
has not benefited from well-meaning international attempts to reform it (such attempts reportedly having 
been carried out without any regard for Haiti’s special circumstances). Haiti has recently experienced a 
surge in decentralized social violence. Disputes over land property have increasingly been resolved, in the 
absence of a functioning judiciary, through violence. In an effort to build non-violent dispute resolution 
skills, the government’s land reform agency, INARA, has tried to incorporate informal arbitration in its 
programs, with modest results. Jacques-Edouard Alexis, until recently the prime minister of Haiti, has 
expressed his interest in a national conflict resolution program to develop appropriate skills among the 
leadership. Civic actors have also proposed a system involves traveling courts, whereby judges and clerks 
spend a day in a locality dealing with disputes before moving on to the next district. In addition, civil 
society organizations of all stripes have joined a growing chorus for administrative and political 
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decentralization, so that the endless deadlocks among the elite in Port-au-Prince do not stymie creative 
energies at the community level. Both alternative arbitration and decentralization could form important 
elements of a multi-sectoral consensus.  
Some of the best prospects for building such a consensus in Haiti may lie with civil society. For 
instance, the informal 1999 accord that paved the way for elections in 2000, and which also produced an 
interim government with ministers drawn from both Fanmi Lavalas and opposition camps, arose partly 
from small-scale efforts towards multi-sectoral dialogue supported by the International Peace Academy. 
This dialogue also assisted in the formation of an autonomous civil society group, the National Council 
for Electoral Observation, which successfully promoted voter education before the parliamentary 
elections in 2000, and then performed credibly its primary function of electoral observation. It also 
convened Fanmi Lavalas and its opponents in informal meetings prior to the elections to obtain 
guarantees from all sides to ensure a peaceful electoral process. Given the overall level of political 
tension, the elections were remarkably free of violence. Subsequently, this dialogue also yielded the Civil 
Society Initiative, which facilitated negotiations to end the deadlock between Aristide and the opposition 
in January 2001 and which, for the first time, involved both the mainstream Catholic and Protestant 
Churches in a joint facilitation role. While these negotiations deadlocked, civil society groups were able 
to ensure that when they did re-start, the protagonists resumed discussions from their last known positions 
rather then reinventing the game all over again. Members of the Initiative have shuttled, with modest 
success, not just between politicians of various stripes, but also between the Aristide camp and key 
sectors such as business and the middle class. As a result, Aristide is now backing, for instance, key 
private sector initiatives to marketize the informal economy. Members of the Initiative have also started, 
with backing from the European Union, a number of multi-sectoral policy dialogues aimed at generating 
concrete proposals for government action. 
Another hopeful sign is the continued resilience of some long-standing grassroots organizations, 
which provided the original backbone for the “Lavalas” movement. These include the Mouvman Papaye 
Paysan, Haiti’s oldest peasant movement, and the Assembly of Popular Organization Power (PROP) that 
had first organized slum-dwellers into a political force on behalf of Aristide. These groups have begun to 
develop issue-specific agendas, critical of the policies of La Fanmi Lavalas. Church movements are also 
reconfiguring their political alignments. A growing evangelical movement, which subscribes to the 
populist right-of-center values similar to those held by their Guatemalan counterparts, has begun to 
challenge both the political establishment and the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church’s Commission 
for Justice and Peace, one of the strongest defenders of human rights in Haiti and long a standard-bearer 
for “Lavalas,” has begun to taken an increasingly independent stance against human rights violations by 
all sides. Although the industrial and professional sectors remain small, unions such as the National 
Federation of Haitian Educators (CNEH) and the Organization of Haitian Industrial Workers (OGITH) 
have begun to take more consistent and independent positions on key issues. This political activity augurs 
well for wider democratic participation and representation.  
Focused discussion on ways to achieve pragmatic compromises between different sectors is 
necessary to develop and implement a process of economic and political reform. Several steps can be 
taken to promote this. The policy dialogues developed by the Civil Society Initiative may assist political 
discourse in moving beyond one of grievance to an articulation of concrete policy differences and options. 
They may also serve to build trust and confidence between the various sectors. Haiti clearly demonstrates 
that, in an atmosphere of fear and recrimination, inter-sectoral relations must improve before elections or 
other trappings of democratic governance can be devised, or else electoral or other democratic outcomes 
will not win the support of those sectors that feel threatened. This does not imply that newly democratic 
governments should not be launched through electoral means. Elections, however, are only one element 
in a wider process to alter inter-sectoral relations and create genuine participation. 
Recently, members of the Civil Society Initiative have proposed the establishment of a Center 
that, with international support, could assist politicians and political parties in acquiring and deploying 
some of the basic tools of democratic political discourse, including coalition building and cooperative 
drafting of legislation.  
In addition to the above, alternative forms of political participation that aid the process of 
institution-building are needed until the formal institutions acquire the desired capacity. These alternative 
forms of participation can be generated within the context of existing policies. For instance, the 
implementation of specific international initiatives to address the problems of development and the 
environment in Haiti could be accompanied by broad-based dialogues among the sectors most likely to be 
affected by them.38 A process of identifying common gains and of mutual guarantees could be a very 
powerful tool for building lasting interaction. Such interaction could eventually form the basis for 
consensual national frameworks for social and economic action. Several international projects of this kind 
have recently unfolded. A USAID project in Fond Jean-Noel, has constituted a federation of 18,000 
farmers into 25 cooperatives to grow and directly market Haitian Bleu coffee for export to US markets, a 
scheme which has fostered both enterprise and environmental conservation. 
Popular participation may also provide the key to better policing. In an effort to reduce police 
corruption, and bring policing closer to the communities, a number of external actors, particularly 
Canada, have sought to institute community policing practices. However, tense social and inter-sectoral 
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relations, land disputes, and vigilantism have hampered the potential for such policing. 
Perhaps the greatest threat to law and order remains the increasing use of Haiti as a transshipment 
point by drug traffickers for drugs flowing from Colombia to the US. The narco-economy provides both a 
disincentive to legitimate state activity and an incentive to illegitimate activity – supporting a web of civic 
corruption. Given the overall dereliction of the Haitian state and the political system, and also the 
international consensus on withholding official aid until the political impasse is broken, the only short-
term solutions to controlling the problem lie among Haiti’s neighbors. One possibility is to engage private 
professional security firms from among Haiti’s neighbors to perform interdiction duties immediately 
outside Haiti’s territorial waters. Another, less politically cumbersome, proposal might be to make an 
exception to the general policy of withholding official assistance by training and resourcing Haiti’s small 
customs force, which has reputedly performed heroically in daunting circumstances.  
Political violence has caused some of Haiti’s most promising talent to flee the country. Some 
have suggested creating a special security force, drawn from the police, for protecting senior government 
officials, leaders of political parties, and other high-profile political personalities.  However, this carries 
the risk of becoming a ‘praetorian guard’. One short-term tactic for combating political impunity could be 
the revival of a domestic version of the type of human rights monitoring and observation carried out by 
international groups, including MICIVIH, in the early 1990s. Representatives of civic organizations could 
accompany personalities considered at particular risk because of their views or political affiliation, as a 
deterrent to attack.  
  
V. Key Conclusions 
  
Haiti’s current crisis demonstrates that there must be change at the level of inter-sectoral relations 
in the country before the formal processes of democracy can be stabilized. The mere existence of such 
processes does not guarantee the success of democracy. Such a change in inter-sectoral relations can be 
brought about by means of dialogue, as happened in Guatemala and as is being proposed by some for 
Haiti, or it can be externally enforced, as is the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, without this 
change, the results of elections and other apparently democratic outcomes will not enjoy legitimacy with 
those sectors that feel threatened.  
The Haiti case provides some specific pointers towards how the international community can 
foster appropriate inter-sectoral relations in a society in order to stabilize the formal processes of 
democracy: 
  
• First, while the primary political factions clearly need to be an important focus of efforts to build 
and sustain peace in any society, they cannot be the only focus. Such a focus needs to be 
embedded in a broader process of dialogue and consultation with representatives of different 
social sectors, so as to generate a consensus on policy parameters that is not easily shaken by 
short-term calculations of the primary factions. 
• Second, no post-conflict society can deliver immediately on the high expectations that its 
members may have of democratic government. As attempts are made to stabilize the situation, 
crises of “social patience” may disrupt the fragile peace. In this context, in addition to ensuring 
that the most elementary needs of the population are satisfied, local and international authorities 
should also ensure maximum participation by civic and community representatives in the 
development and implementation of initiatives designed for their benefit. This participation will 
not only engender a sense of forward momentum and hope, thereby alleviating some of the crisis 
of “social patience,” but also create a sounder basis for democracy by encouraging local 
organization centered on such participation.  
• Third, the rule of law, and the availability of security and justice for the common person, are 
clearly important determinants of the degree to which democracy can emerge and be stabilized in 
a post-conflict situation. Should political factions continue to dominate the political discourse 
through fear and impunity, then politics will be deadlocked along the lines of their often 
contradictory interests. The emergence of other voices, however, will open new spaces for 
compromise. Hence, the establishment of the rule of law, including through interim means such 
as community policing and alternate dispute resolution, should be a top priority for international 
and local actors.  
• Fourth, the type of economic strategy in a post-conflict situation that may support the emergence 
of viable local political processes may not often coincide with conventional understandings of 
sound strategies. The demands of fiscal discipline, and rapid inflows and outflows of capital, may 
generate stresses and competition of the type that immature political systems are unable to 
handle. On the other hand, development schemes that are not-initially capital intensive but 
centered on providing the simple means (title, credit, etc.) through which common persons can 
engage in entrepreneurial activity may generate greater longer-term wherewithal for political 
stability. Persons engaged in sound productive activity may be less susceptible to the short-term 
blandishments of various factions.  
• Fifth, international efforts should take into account the possibility of significant variation 
between local and international understandings of the factors that may lead to sustainable peace, 
both before and after conflict. In local understandings of these matters have emerged through 
open and participatory processes (as has happened on several occasions during recent years in 
Haiti), or reflect agreement between key sectors, then they should be honored, even if they differ 
from preferred international courses of action. Only through a genuine process of interaction and 
learning will the key local actors appreciate the finer elements of democratic participation.  
• Sixth, the ideological polarization generated by extended periods of conflict can significantly 
erode the ability of key actors in a society to bargain concretely around specific policy issues. 
Great emphasis should be placed on reviving or strengthening this ability.  
  
These arguments also point towards a different road-map for conceptualizing and implementing external 
actions, including those by the United States, creating and sustaining peace in societies ridden by conflict: 
  
Viable political processes are central to peace: 
While countries may have had long-standing economic, social, or environmental problems that could 
raise the level of internal tension, the actual eruption of mass violence is contingent on the extent to which 
existing political processes can manage these tensions. Hence, the key to creating or sustaining peace 
within a country lies not with economic or humanitarian assistance, but with reviving or strengthening 
political processes that can successfully manage current and future tensions. In the absence of such 
processes, other kinds of international assistance may even increase the levels of conflict.  
  
Fostering peace is conducive to long-term US national security: 
Usually, when mass violence erupts in vulnerable countries, it does not directly threaten US national 
interests. Even when there is a threat, it may only be brief. However, given the increasingly porous nature 
of national boundaries, such violence may occasionally lead to longer-term threats. Haiti sent waves of 
refugees to US shores in the 1990s; now it is one of the most significant points of transshipment of drugs 
into the United States. Similarly, the failure of interested parties, including the US, to support a viable 
political process in Afghanistan in the 1990s has now created a significant threat for international peace 
and security. It is quite likely that in the absence of muscular US-led intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo 
in 1995 and 1999 respectively, the region would now face greater political instability from radicalized 
minorities on the one hand, and outlaw regimes on the other. Hence, across the board, it is in US interest 
to support the revival of viable political processes in countries torn by violent conflict. However, to the 
extent that such conflict is only likely to threaten US security on an uneven basis, this support can be of a 
very specific and focused nature, rather than open-ended “nation-building” that many policy makers fear. 
  
External interventions should focus on reviving participatory political processes and the rule of law: 
Such focused and specific assistance should involve two components: first, the re-establishment of rule of 
law, and basic security, in a manner that allows open political activity to resume and viable political 
processes to emerge; second, the rapid identification, through dialogue among all relevant parties, of a 
common consensus on the parameters of a truly participatory and resilient political process. It is critical 
that this common consensus should be based not just on the views of the leaders of the parties to conflict, 
but also of representatives of civic organizations and key social sectors such as religious groups (accords 
signed between leaders are often based on tactical considerations, and rarely represent lasting and deep-
seated consensus on their own). It is also critical that these two components precede the holding of 
internationally-sponsored elections, otherwise the continuation of intimidation and the absence of deep-
seated political consensus will lead to an affirmation of the fault-lines of conflict through the electoral 
exercise (as happened in Bosnia in 1996). These components should also precede the provision of large-
scale assistance for reconstruction. In the absence of a common understanding of the needs of the country, 
parties to conflict will resume fighting over the division of such assistance (as happened in Somalia, and 
as has happened in Haiti).  
  
Peace operations should support the building of political consensus and the restoration of rule of law: 
The plans for any international peace operation (whether it is characterized as “peacekeeping,” or 
“peacemaking,” or “monitoring”), and for its “exit strategy,” should be drawn up to focus on two 
components identified above. The civilian side of the operation should prioritize the building of the 
necessary political consensus. The military side should focus on the rapid restoration of the rule of law. 
Neither side will be able to carry out its task without active participation from all levels of indigenous 
leadership—from the national to the local. In this context, it should be noted that the local institutions that 
provide both genuine political participation and the rule of law may differ greatly from their Western 
counterparts. In Somalia and Afghanistan, for instance, local clan leaderships and tribal elders have 
traditionally provided both genuine and significant political participation as well as rule of law, and 
sustainable peace in both countries will require substantive engagement with these leaders. 
  
“Exit strategies” should center on the revival of local political processes: 
A tight focus on the facilitating political consensus, and on establishing the rule of law, will allow 
external actors to work within the frame of a definite and achievable “exit strategy.” The other aspects of 
reconstruction—economic, social, environmental, and so on—can be directly handled through 
negotiations between the newly revived and secure local political process on the one hand, and relevant 
international institutions such as the World Bank, the United Nations Environment Programme, or the UN 
Fund for Women on the other. These aspects need not be included within the parameters of a peace 
operation, or any other type of time-bound intervention by external actors. The task of “nation-building” 
belongs fundamentally to the nations concerned. In this context, all indications to date are that the types 
of “transitional administrations” that have been established by international authorities in a number of 
countries in recent years, where external administrators run entire polities and economies, may stabilize 
the situation in the short term, but may not enable countries to stand on their feet in the long run. 
  
External interventions in internal conflicts should be based only on a common strategy: 
A focused international effort to support the emergence of a viable political process can only work if all 
concerned external actors operate within the framework a common strategy. It could be disruptive, for 
instance, if a large sum of money were made available for reconstruction by one international institution 
at the same time as another international institution is attempting to facilitate a consensus on the nature of 
the political process. The parties to conflict, instead of focusing on the long term, may turn their attention 
to squabbling over how best to use the money, without first having developed the political capacity to 
make such decisions on their own. If international actors then step in and resolve the dispute by imposing 
a solution, they could undermine the long-term viability of the country’s political process, and also add 
years to their “exit strategy.” Hence, a common strategy is critical for international actors. However, 
while most actors appreciate the importance of coordination, no one ever submits to the imposition of 
such coordination. Most attempts at mutual coordination rarely amount to being more than a degree of 
information-sharing. Under these circumstances, the mapping of a common strategy could be greatly 
enhanced through the nomination of an authoritative and credible facilitator—a high representative of the 
international community—for each instance of violent conflict, whose primary task will be to ensure that 
key actors adjust the timing and extent of their interventions to allow the emergence of rule of law and 
viable political processes prior to the provision of other types of assistance. For instance, the US may 
wish to propose in the near future the nomination of such a facilitator, preferably a credible international 
diplomat with strong standing in the Islamic world, for the task of ensuring coordinated international 
support for a viable political process in Afghanistan. 
  
External interventions should draw upon knowledge of a country’s political evolution: 
A key ingredient of any planning aimed at ensuring sustainable peace in a society is a thorough 
knowledge of the large-scale political evolution of that society through the course of history, and of the 
factors that have driven this evolution. This knowledge need not be of the detailed scholarly variety that 
focuses on sociological or anthropological minutia, but nevertheless needs to be thorough and grounded 
in experience gleaned from previous international work in the relevant countries. One of the key tasks of 
the international facilitator proposed above could be to ensure that relevant international actors have 
direct access to the collective wisdom of researchers and experts that may have focused on particular 
countries. Students of Haiti, for instance, have long known that the very circumstances under which the 
country became independent, as well as subsequent developments, have created a severe social chasm 
within that country that has constantly derailed its politics. An international strategy for intervention in 
Haiti should have been premised, therefore, not on the immediate revival of its dysfunctional institutions, 
no matter how democratic they appeared, but on creating the prior political consensus across social 
groups that may have allowed these institutions to function more effectively. Similarly, experts on 
Afghanistan have long warned that the country’s national life is the equivalent of the ethnography of 
Somalia mapped onto the geography of Scotland, and has never supported more than the most fragmented 
or tenuous of polities. Any attempt at “nation-building” in Afghanistan is, therefore, likely to come to 
quick and extreme grief. 
